The announcement made at the opening of the ILA Berlin Air Show 2026 marked the end of a historic chapter in European aeronautical cooperation. For years presented as the very symbol of continental strategic autonomy the FCAS/SCAF (Future Combat Air System), the Franco-German-Spanish next-generation air combat programme has seen its joint development path halted for its most ambitious component: the NGF (New Generation Fighter) manned combat aircraft.
What remains on the table is a more fragmented architecture, built around the concept of a “system of systems.” Work continues on the Combat Cloud the digital network designed to link platforms and sensors and on autonomous remote vehicles, commonly referred to as loyal wingmen. Yet the abandonment of a common manned aircraft represents an industrial and geopolitical turning point that is redrawing the balance of European defence and raising critical questions about the continent’s future strategic autonomy.
The Anatomy of a Foretold Collapse
The failure of the NGF component is not due to technological shortcomings, but rather to the difficulty of reconciling deeply divergent industrial interests and operational requirements.
Launched in 2017 under the political impetus of the Paris-Berlin axis, the programme gradually encountered obstacles related to workshare distribution, intellectual property protection, and the definition of development responsibilities.
On one side, Dassault Aviation claimed leadership over the aircraft design and flight control systems, drawing on its proven experience developing the Rafale and carrier-based aircraft. On the other, Airbus Defence and Space representing German and Spanish industrial interests argued for a more balanced distribution of roles in areas deemed strategically critical.
Further complicating matters were fundamental operational differences. France required a platform compatible with its strategic nuclear deterrent and the future requirements of the French Navy, while Germany prioritised specifications focused primarily on air defence and full interoperability within NATO structures.
A factor often underestimated concerns the programme’s governance. The decision-making structure proved particularly unwieldy when it came to resolving industrial and political disputes between partners with differing national priorities. Over time, evolving cost estimates and rising technological ambitions further amplified tensions among the participants.
Future Scenarios: The New Map of Sixth-Generation Air Power
The end of the NGF component opens a phase of strategic redefinition that could lead Europe down very different paths.
Scenario 1: The Challenge of French Autonomy
France finds itself in a position where it must preserve its technological and strategic sovereignty in the field of advanced air combat.
Its national industrial base comprising Dassault Aviation, Safran, Thales, and MBDA represents one of the few ecosystems in the world capable of independently developing most of the technologies required for a modern combat system.
However, a national programme would require substantial investment and long-term political continuity. To ensure economic sustainability, Paris may be required to bear a larger share of development costs through national funding and to identify significant export opportunities in international markets.
Independent development would guarantee the highest level of decision-making sovereignty, but it would also entail greater industrial and financial risks compared to those shared within a multinational programme.
Scenario 2: Berlin’s Strategic Dilemma
Germany currently lacks an equivalent national programme capable of filling the capability gap left by the termination of the NGF.
For this reason, many observers view the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) developed by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan as one of the most concrete options available to Berlin.
The programme already has a defined industrial structure, centralised governance, and a timeline targeting entry into service in the second half of the next decade.
Nevertheless, German participation would also represent a significant political choice. It would mean strengthening cooperation with an industrial axis outside the traditional Franco-German engine of European integration, while accepting that many fundamental technological decisions have already been set by the founding partners.
Questions would also remain open regarding future interoperability between Europe’s various air defence capabilities.
Scenario 3: Seeking New Partnerships and Bilateral Channels
Spain continues to face the need to renew part of its combat aircraft fleet over the coming years.
In parallel, Madrid has developed increasingly significant industrial relations with Turkey in recent years, as demonstrated by several agreements in the aerospace and defence sectors.
Some analysts believe this cooperation could, over the long term, open new avenues for collaboration in the field of advanced aerial systems. However, any developments in this direction remain subject to future assessment, and no official decisions have yet been made to clearly define the path ahead.
Challenges also persist regarding regional geopolitical dynamics, regulatory differences, and the technological evolution of programmes still under development.
The Diagonal Solution: Piaggio Aerospace as an Industrial Bridge
In this fragmented landscape, one element of particular interest could emerge from the acquisition of Piaggio Aerospace by a major Turkish industrial group. Rather than being a direct consequence of current European dynamics, this transaction could potentially serve as an indirect channel to facilitate future industrial cooperation between Ankara and certain European partners, including Spain.
This hypothesis rests on three key areas of strategic interest:
The European Regulatory Framework
Any industrial activity conducted through a production entity based in Italy could, within specific programmes and in compliance with existing regulations, operate within the European industrial environment, facilitating certain processes of technological integration and certification.
Convergence in the Unmanned Sector
Piaggio Aerospace has developed significant expertise in remotely piloted systems through programmes such as the P.1HH HammerHead, alongside extensive experience in airframe design and composite materials.
Meanwhile, Turkey has emerged as one of the world’s leading players in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles and armed remotely piloted systems. Over the long term, combining these complementary capabilities could create opportunities for technological cooperation in specific segments of the aerospace market.
A Potential Indirect Industrial Channel
While remaining fully committed to the GCAP programme through Leonardo, Italy could find itself at the centre of an industrial ecosystem capable of connecting European and Turkish entities within targeted projects.
In this context, the presence of an industrial actor rooted in European territory could offer additional opportunities for dialogue and technological cooperation, reducing some of the industrial and political complexities that often accompany large multinational programmes.
This remains, of course, a potential scenario rather than a defined trajectory. Much will depend on future industrial decisions, government authorisations, and the evolution of the broader European geopolitical landscape.
The European Budget Short-Circuit
The difficulties encountered by FCAS arise against a backdrop of growing pressure on defence budgets.
European states are simultaneously required to strengthen conventional military capabilities, modernise strategic infrastructure, develop cyber defence capacity, and support security initiatives linked to the conflict in Ukraine.
Within this framework, next-generation programmes must compete with immediate operational requirements that demand rapid results and consistent funding.
As a result, many nations tend to prioritise solutions already available on the market, reducing operational risk and accelerating procurement timelines. While this choice responds to genuine security needs, in the long term it risks limiting Europe’s ability to independently develop the most advanced strategic technologies.
The challenge therefore lies not only in the availability of financial resources, but also in the capacity to plan industrial investments that deliver results over decades.
Beyond Fragmentation
The end of the joint NGF project represents far more than a simple industrial setback.
It demonstrates that European strategic autonomy cannot be built through ambitious technological programmes alone. Instead, it requires a lasting convergence of political, industrial, and military interests, supported by decision-making mechanisms capable of overcoming inevitable national divergences.
The paths that France, Germany, and Spain may take in the coming years will differ. Yet all will face an inescapable reality: the growing technological and financial complexity of sixth-generation programmes makes it increasingly difficult for any single nation to sustain the entire development cycle independently.
The failure of the NGF also shows how the defence of industrial prerogatives deemed non-negotiable by individual national actors has, over time, taken precedence over the construction of a shared European interest. It is precisely in this tension between industrial sovereignty and strategic integration that the term “industrial absolutism” referenced in the title of this analysis finds its meaning.
The real question emerging from the NGF collapse is not merely what Europe’s next fighter jet will be, but whether Europe will succeed in building a common vision for its own defence. For in an increasingly competitive global environment, industrial fragmentation risks becoming a far more significant strategic limitation than the absence of a single combat aircraft platform.
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