LA NUOVA VIA DELLA SETA AEROSPAZIALE: La Cina sfida il monopolio occidentale

 

 

 

 

From exercises in Qatar to global co‑production agreements: China’s geopolitical and commercial offensive to build a defence ecosystem alternative to the West’s

 

 

In mid‑May 2026, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV aired a report destined to draw the attention of international defence analysts. In the segment, later picked up by Asian media and the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) community, Beijing claimed that the Chengdu J‑10CE fighter had achieved a “9‑0” result against an unspecified “advanced European aircraft”, comprising five close‑range dogfights and four beyond‑visual‑range (BVR) engagements .

 

Although the Chinese state network did not officially name the countries involved, most OSINT analysts linked the report to the “Zilzal‑II” bilateral exercise held over Qatar in January 2024, between Pakistan Air Force (PAF) J‑10CEs and Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) Eurofighter Typhoons. The exercise itself was confirmed by official Pakistani sources and specialist defence media, but the numerical score published by CCTV has never been independently verified or validated by Western observers.

 

Beijing’s choice to publicise this outcome more than two years after the event is far more than domestic propaganda. It reflects a much broader geopolitical, industrial and economic strategy: to demonstrate that Chinese military technology has now reached levels competitive with Western platforms, laying the ground for strong export growth and the creation of new international industrial partnerships.

 

This strategic vision is not limited to the military sphere. It mirrors a wider, integrated project, in which the COMAC civil aerospace programme with the C919 now in commercial service within China and Beijing targeting EASA international certification in the long term  serves as a perfect counterpart to developments in defence. Just as with the J‑10CE and other weapon systems, China offers governments and industries an alternative model: competitive technology, cost efficiency, technology transfer, and fewer political conditions compared to Western standards.

 

The “New Aerospace Silk Road” thus unites defence and civil aviation into a single global network, designed to challenge Western dominance and reshape the balance of aerospace trade and geopolitical influence in the skies of the 21st century.

 

Beyond sales: China’s formula for strategic independence

 

For decades, Chinese arms exports were associated mainly with affordable platforms derived from Soviet‑era designs, marketed to nations with limited defence budgets. Today the picture has changed fundamentally.

 

Beijing now offers advanced multirole aircraft widely classified as “4.5‑generation” and is preparing to introduce the export version of the stealth fighter J‑35 onto the international market, presenting a commercial model that proves highly attractive to many non‑aligned nations:

 

- Reduced political conditionality: unlike the operational restrictions and geopolitical strings often attached to Western programmes, Chinese agreements tend to offer greater diplomatic and industrial flexibility.

- Economic and financial competitiveness: advanced technology packages at generally lower cost than Western equivalents, often supported by state‑backed credit lines and industrial cooperation programmes.

 

The true strategic leap, however, lies in the shift from simply selling complete systems to establishing co‑production and technology‑transfer partnerships.

 

The industrial network: co‑production and regional hubs

 

The Pakistan model

 

Collaboration with the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) on the JF‑17 Thunder programme stands as one of the most significant examples of China’s strategy. The aircraft is co‑produced locally, enabling Islamabad to build industrial expertise, maintenance capacity and specialised employment. This partnership is steadily expanding to cover logistical support for the J‑10CE as well as future programmes linked to next‑generation stealth aircraft.

 

Expansion into the Middle East and Africa

 

Following the Pakistani template, several countries are deepening industrial cooperation with China’s aerospace sector. Egypt, according to multiple industry sources, has expressed interest in the J‑10CE and in expanding local industrial capabilities, building on earlier collaboration over the K‑8 trainer aircraft .

 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also launched partnerships with Beijing, acquiring the supersonic advanced trainer L‑15 (JL‑10) a clear sign of growing openness to Chinese aerospace technology in a region historically dominated by Western suppliers.

 

Logistics and maintenance hubs in Southeast Asia

 

In Southeast Asia, various nations are evaluating industrial frameworks that include regional maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) centres linked to future Chinese platforms. Countries such as Bangladesh and Indonesia are increasingly interested in models guaranteeing greater logistical and industrial autonomy, while Beijing aims to establish permanent technical presence in areas deemed strategic along key Indo‑Pacific routes.

 

The technology ecosystem: satellites, drones and data‑links

 

China’s commercial push extends far beyond manned combat aircraft. The objective is increasingly focused on building an integrated, self‑sufficient C4ISR ecosystem an alternative to the Western model.

 

Bilateral agreements signed with regional partners typically include:

 

- integration with the Chinese BeiDou satellite network, a sovereign alternative to the US‑operated GPS for precision guidance;

- secure, proprietary communications and data‑link systems;

- advanced electronic warfare (EW) suites;

- technology transfers related to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UAVs).

 

In particular, China has gained a dominant position across many emerging markets through exports of the Wing Loong and Cai Hong (CH) drone families  especially in the Middle East and North Africa, where Western restrictions and political vetoes have often left significant commercial gaps.

 

The “human factor” and strategic narrative

 

Within the broader context of China’s global expansion, the televised claim of a “9‑0” victory carries above all political and communicative weight.

 

In advanced air combat exercises such as DACT (Dissimilar Air Combat Training), the platform is only one part of the operational equation. Pitting aircraft with differing aerodynamic characteristics, weights and design philosophies serves to test tactics, not to declare absolute winners. Radar configurations, rules of engagement (ROE) and specific scenario constraints such as operating without AWACS support or under heavy electronic jamming  can heavily influence final outcomes. By definition, results from DACT do not equate to proof of absolute technical superiority in a real symmetrical war.

 

In the case attributed to “Zilzal‑II”, many observers highlighted the decisive role of the human factor. On one side were PAF pilots: highly experienced professionals with a flexible doctrine shaped both by NATO standards (from decades of operating the F‑16) and Chinese methodologies. On the other was the Qatari Air Force  an effective force, but in the midst of a massive modernisation and logistical transition, simultaneously absorbing three distinct advanced aircraft fleets: the F‑15QA, Rafale and the very same Typhoon.

 

Rather than proving definitive technical superiority of the J‑10CE over the Eurofighter Typhoon still regarded as one of the most capable and sophisticated aircraft in its class Beijing’s message appears aimed squarely at emerging markets: to present China as an increasingly competitive supplier of a technological, industrial and political alternative.

 

Conclusions

 

The CCTV report from May 2026 is above all a geopolitical signal. Through a combination of arms exports, technology transfer, industrial cooperation and diplomatic flexibility, China is building an ever‑wider international network across aerospace and defence.

 

The J‑10CE is merely one tool within this comprehensive strategy. More important than the numerical result of a closed‑door exercise is the emergence of a Chinese aerospace ecosystem  military and civil  now structured on a global scale, capable of matching Western reach and influence, and progressively challenging the long‑established historical dominance built up by the West since the post‑war era.